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Abstract. This paper uses cross-country data to examine the long-term effect of trade openness on the gender 
gaps in wages, education, political empowerment and health. Key findings are: trade openness since 1970 
reduced the gender gaps in wages and educational attainment as of 2011 but did not influence the gaps in 
political attainment and health status. The effect of trade openness on the gender wage gap remained 
observable in later years (1980, 1990 and 2000), although it decreased in degree over time. On the other hand, 
the effect of trade openness on the gender gap in educational attainment disappeared in 2000. Similar results 
were obtained even after controlling for endogenous bias.   
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1. Introduction.
In the present era of globalization, markets have become increasingly open. 
Globalization has increased the number of individuals participating in markets, leading to 
markets becoming more competitive. Competitive pressure through international trade 
seems to change not only efficiency but also non-market interpersonal relations.  
The gender gap is a hot issue in modern society (World Economic Forum 2011; 
Wolszczak-Derlacz 2013). For instance, economic researchers have paid considerable 
attention to analyzing the nature of the gender wage gap (Weichselbaumer and 
Winter-Ebmer 2005). According to the seminal work of Becker (1959), increased 
competition in the product market reduces discrimination in the long run. If this finding is 
correct, increasing competitive pressure through international trade should reduce 
discrimination against women and decrease the gender wage gap. However, arguments 
against this hypothesis also exist based on Becker’s theory1. Existing literatures have 
attempted to empirically test this hypothesis (Berik, Vand der Meullen Rodgers and 
Zveglich 2004, BVZ; Black and Brainerd 2004; Menon and Vand der Meullen Rodgers 
2009)2. Black and Brainerd (2004) used census data from the United States to find that 
trade reduces the ability of firms to discriminate against women. Conversely, other works 
1 Various researchers have analyzed the relation between trade liberalization and gender 
gaps (e.g., Van Staveren et al. 2007; Fontana 2009). 
2 Saure and Zoabi (2014) constructed the model to show that the marginal productivity of 
women drops more than that of men if trade expands sectors with intensive female 
employment. Thus, the gender wage gap widens.  
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using data from Asian countries such as Taiwan and Korea (BVZ 2004) and India (Menon 
and Vand der Meullen Rodgers 2009) failed to find that competition from trade decreased 
wage discrimination against women. Because these works use data from certain countries, 
the estimation results vary according to social and economic conditions in the countries 
from which data is obtained. Hence, it is necessary to conduct the examination using 
cross-country data to investigate how Becker’s theory generally applied to the gender wage 
gap.  
Discrimination against women in the labor market decreased with increasing 
international trade. Under this condition, women’s marginal productivity is reflected in 
their wage levels. Human capital, such as educational attainment, is thought to play a more 
important role for women in the labor market as international trade increases. In response to 
this, educational attainment for women naturally improved, and consequently the gender 
gap in educational attainment decreased. Thus far, the impacts of globalization on education 
spending and human capital formation have been examined (e.g., Anderson and Konard 
2003 a; 2003 b; Baskaran and Hessami, 2012; Shastry 2012). However, little is known 
about how international trade influences the gender gap in educational attainment. It is 
valuable to explore the effects of international trade on the gender wage and education gaps, 
and simultaneously to consider the mechanism of how competitive pressure associated with 
trade changes gender inequality in the labor and education markets. This study analyzes 
how international trade influences the gender gaps by considering jointly the decrease in 
discrimination against women and the increase in women’s human capital. 
If gender gaps do not immediately respond to trade openness, it is useful to consider the 
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long-term effect of trade openness on gender gaps. To this end, the effect of trade openness 
in 1970 on the gender gaps in 2011 is examined. Furthermore, this paper compares this 
effect with those of trade openness in intervening years (1980, 1990 and 2000) to consider 
the time lag in the appearance of any effect. This paper used a cross-country dataset 
sourced mainly from the World Bank and the Global Gender Gap Report 2011 
(GGGR2011).  
The key findings were the following. Trade openness decreased the gender wage gap in 
2011 regardless of the number of years of trade openness. However, the strength of this 
effect decreased as the number of years of trade openness increased. On the other hand, 
trade openness in 1970 decreased the gender gap in educational attainment, which was 
robust to alternative specifications. However, the effect on the gender education gap of 
trade openness in intervening years (1980, 1990, 2000) was less robust.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 proposed testable 
hypotheses. Section 3 explained the data and empirical method. Section 4 presented the 
estimation results and their interpretation. The final section provided conclusions. 
 
2. Hypotheses  
If the gender wage gap decreases owing to international trade, female students are 
predicted to have a greater incentive to learn. Consequently, the cognitive skills of female 
students will improve relative to those of male students (Guiso, Monte, Sapienza and 
Zingales 2008; Fryer and Levitt 2010). The higher the scores of female students in 
achievement tests, the more likely girls are to get scholarships for entrance to higher-level 
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schools and the greater the inventive of parents to invest in the education of daughters 
relative to sons. Restated, international trade decreases the gender gap in educational 
attainment. However, human capital accumulation proceeds slower than improvement of 
wage levels because it takes over 20 years for a newborn girl to graduate from tertiary 
education. Therefore, it takes many years for the responses of female students to improved 
female wage levels to be reflected in female educational attainment. Moreover, parents of 
daughters have a larger incentive to invest in their daughters’ education only after observing 
a relative increase in female wages. Hence, a time lag exists between the decreases in the 
gender wage gap and the gender educational attainment gap. 
Based on the above observations, I propose the following testable hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: Trade openness decreased not only the gender wage gap but also the 
gender education gap,  
Hypothesis 2: The effect of trade on the gender education gap trails its effect on the 
gender wage gap.  
 
3. Data and method  
Data 3.1. 
  As is presented in Table 1, the cross-country data used in this paper were gathered from 
various sources. Discrimination against women can exist in various contexts and so the 
World Economic Forum (2011) considered various subcategories of the gender gap to 
calculate the Global Gender Gap Index (GGGI). To test the hypotheses proposed in the 
previous section, it is useful to use data for subcategories of the gender gap, rather than 
6 
 
GGGI. In GGGR for 2011, the World Economic Forum (2011) provided not only the 
gender wage gap but also the gender gaps in educational, political and health situations in 
2011. These data are used for estimations. Furthermore, the World Bank provided data on 
trade openness in various years. To compare the long-term and medium-term effects of 
trade, this paper used trade openness in 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000. Additionally, data on 
GDP per capita in 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000 were gathered from the Penn World Table. 
As for other national characteristics, the degree of democracy, legal origins, religions and 
latitude used in La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishni (1999; LLSV) were 
obtained from the website of Shleifer. The total sample size was 92 (92, 100 and 109) when 
using trade openness in 1970 (1980, 1990 and 2000). Data on trade openness were not 
available for some countries in the earliest years of opening up, and this is why the sample 
size was smaller in the earlier years.  
  According to the definition in Table 1, the wage gap variables such as WAGE_GAP 
(EDUC_GAP, POLI_GAP and HEAL_GAP) show the female-male ratios of proxies for the 
wage, educational, political and heath situations. Accordingly, the larger the values of these 
gender gap variables, the better the situations of women. In Fig. 1 (a)–(d), the vertical axes 
are WAGE_GAP, EDUC_GAP, POLI_GAP and HEAL_GAP, respectively. In the figures, 
the horizontal line is OPEN_1970 (trade openness in 1970). Cursory examination of Fig. 1 
(a) reveals wide variation of WAGE_GAP, which ranges between 40 % and 90 %. 
Furthermore, OPEN_1970 was positively related to WAGE_GAP. This implies that trade 
openness decreases the gender wage gap, in line with Becker’s theory. Compared with 
WAGE_GAP in Fig. 1 (a), EDUC_GAP and HEAL_GAP were concentrated in the upper 
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ranges of the vertical axes in Fig. 1 (b) and (d). In most countries, EDUC_GAP 
(HEAL_GAP) gap exceeded 80 % (95 %), indicating that these gaps were very small. In 
contrast, POLI_GAP was concentrated in the lower range of the vertical axis in Fig. 1 (c). 
In most countries, POLI_GAP was below 40 %. Therefore, political gap was generally very 
large. Furthermore, Fig. 1 (b)–(d) did not show that OPEN_1970 was clearly related to 
EDUC_GAP, POLI_GAP and HEAL_GAP, respectively. These figures do not control for 
other variables such as national characteristics. Hence, in section 3, to examine the data 
more closely, I conducted regression estimations to control for various factors. 
 
Baseline model 3.2. 
To test the hypotheses, this study attempted to examine the effect of trade openness on 
gender gaps. To this end, the following estimated function of the baseline model was used: 
Yi = 0 + 1 OPEN_1970i + 2 Ln(GDP_1970) i + X’Β+εi      
Y: WAGE_GAP (EDUC_GAP, POLI_GAP or HEAL_GAP)  
X: Vector of variables to control for country characteristics  
B: Vector of coefficients of variables to control for country characteristics  
 
where Yi represents the dependent variable (proxy for the gender gap in 2011) for country i. 
Regression parameters are represented by . The error term is represented by εi. 
Furthermore, disturbances in the equation when WAGE_GAP is a dependent variable may 
correlate with disturbances when EDUC_GAP (POLI_GAP or HEAL_GAP) is a dependent 
variable. WAGE_GAP, EDUC_GAP, POLI_GAP and HEAL_GAP are thought to be jointly 
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estimated because of correlations between disturbances. In this case, a seemingly unrelated 
regression model (SUR) model is preferred (Greene 2008). 
The key independent variable for investigating the long-term effect of trade openness 
is OPEN_1970. In terms of alternative specifications, using trade openness at 10-year 
intervals (OPEN_1980, OPEN_1990 or OPEN_2000), I attempt to check the robustness of 
the effects of OPEN_1970 and its medium-term effects. From Hypothesis 1, the coefficient 
of OPEN_1970 (OPEN_1980, OPEN_1990 or OPEN_2000) is predicted to be positive 
when WAGE_GAP (or EDUC_GAP) is the dependent variable. Furthermore, from 
Hypothesis 2, trade openness is more likely to be statistically significant for estimation of 
EDUC_GAP in the earlier years of that trade openness. Additionally, the log of GDP per 
capita in the comparison year is included to control for degree of economic development. 
Political factors are considered critical to the effects of globalization on labor 
condition and human capital formation (e.g., Anderson and Konard 2003 a; 2003 b; 
Baskaran and Hessami 2012). Furthermore, globalization outcomes differed among the 
regions to which the studied countries belong (BVZ 2004; Black and Brainerd 2004; 
Menon and Vand der Meullen Rodgers 2009; Boler 2015). For instance, the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) critically impacted the gender gap (Juhn and 
Ujhelyi 2013; 2014). It is necessary to consider these factors for the sake of generality of 
the estimation results based on the cross-country data. Regarding the control variables 
included in X, political, legal, geographical and religious conditions are taken into account. 
To reduce the possibility of reverse causality, as described in the definition of Table 1, time 
varying variables such as DMOCR and religious variables (CATHO, PROT and MUSL) are 
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included in the far distant year. In more democratic countries, the gender gap seems 
reduced and so the coefficient of DMOCR is expected to have a positive sign. Legal origin 
is an important institutional factor that influences economic and political conditions (La 
Porta, Loez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 2008) and so LEGAL_FR, LEGAL_SO, LEGAL_GE 
and LEGAL_SC are included to control for it. Roles played by women are determined by 
religion and should be taken into account. This is why CATHO, PROT and MUSL are 
included. Geography and regional specific factors are taken into account by incorporating 
latitude and dummies for region such as ASIA, S_AMERIC and EUROP.  
 
Model using instrumental variables 3.3. 
 Gender wage and educational gaps may influence international trade relations (Busse and 
Spielmann 2006). Furthermore, gender gaps may influence GDP per capita. For instance, 
an increase in women’s human capital may lead women to become skilled labor, which in 
turn influences GDP. If such an effect holds, reverse causality leads to endogenous bias in 
the estimation results. Trade openness and GDP can be considered the predetermined 
exogenous variable because of long time lags between the dependent and independent 
variables. However, to more closely examine the effect of openness, exogenous 
instrumental variables are used to control for bias based on the GMM 2SLS model (Greene, 
2008).  
In this model, trade openness and log of GDP are treated as endogenous variables. Log 
of population size in the same year as the trade openness, DMOCR, and legal origin 
dummies are used as exogenous instrumental variables that are included in the first stage 
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estimation but not the second stage estimations. Country size is expected to cause scale 
economy, which in turn influences openness and GDP. However, population size did not 
seem to influence the gender gap, which suggests the validity of the instrumental variable. 
As shown later in Table 2, DEMOCR and legal origin dummies did not exhibit statistical 
significance in most cases of the baseline model. Furthermore, as shown in Table 4 (a)–(d), 
exclusion of DEMOCR and legal origin dummies did not change the results of trade 
openness. This indicated that these variables are unlikely to be related to the dependent 
variables. For robustness check, in alternative specifications of the GMM 2SLS model, 
DMOCR is not included in the set of exogenous instrumental variables. 
 
4. Estimation results  
 
Table 2 presented the results of the baseline (SUR) model where results of all control 
variables are shown. The results of control variables in Tables 3–6 were no different from 
those in Table 2, and so only the result of trade openness was shown3. Table 3 (a)–(c) 
showed the results of the SUR model when OPEN_1970 was replaced by OPEN_1980, 
OPEN_1990 and OPEN_2000, respectively. Table 4 (a)–(d) reported the results where 
DMOCR and legal origin dummies are excluded from the set of independent variables. 
Table 5 (a)–(d) reported the estimation results of the GMM 2SLS model where the logs of 
population size in the same years as the trade openness, DMOCR and legal origin dummies 
were used as exogenous instrumental variables in the first stage. Table 6 (a)–(d) reported 
                                                   
3 Full estimation results of Tables 3 to 6 are available from the author upon request. 
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the estimation results of the GMM 2SLS model where DMOCR was excluded from the set 
of exogenous instrumental variables in the first stage. 
 From Table 2 we can see that OPEN_1970 was positive and statistically significant at 
the 1 % level in column (1). Column (2) suggested that the coefficient of OPEN_1970 was 
positive and statistically significant at the 5 % level. This implied that trade openness in 
1970 reduced the gender wage and educational gaps in 2011. Trade openness thus had the 
long-term effect of improving female wages and educational level relative to men. This is 
consistent with Hypothesis 1. Moreover, the absolute value of the coefficient of 
OPEN_1970 was 0.06 and 0.02 when the dependent variable was WAGE_GAP and 
EDUC_GAP, respectively. This can be interpreted as implying that a 1 % increase in the 
trade-GDP ratio (trade/GDP in 1970) leads to increases of 0.06 % and 0.02 % in the gender 
wage and educational gaps, respectively. Hence, the marginal effect of OPEN_1970 on 
WAGE_GAP was three times larger than that on EDUC_GAP. In contrast, OPEN_1970 
was negative and not statistically significant in columns (3) and (4). Therefore, trade 
openness did not have a long-term effect on POLI_GAP and HEAL_GAP. It follows from 
this that competitive pressure in the market was unlikely to influence women’s situations in 
terms of political empowerment and health. 
As for other control variables, GDP_1970 was positive and significant when 
EDUC_GAP was the dependent variable, suggesting that the gender educational gap was 
smaller in more developed countries in 1970. Developed countries could invest in 
compulsory basic education for both sexes. Consistent with the prediction, the coefficient 
of DEMOCR was positive in all columns despite not being statistically significant. The 
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dummies of legal origin showed barely significant results for estimations of WAGE_GAP 
and EDUC_GAP. 
Now, switching attention to Table 3 (a)–(c), as for the estimation results of WAGE_GAP, 
the coefficient of trade openness was positive and significant at the 1 % level. The absolute 
value of its coefficient was 0.06 when OPEN_1980 and OPEN_1990 were the independent 
variables, and was 0.05 when OPEN_2000 was the independent variable. Accordingly, the 
results of trade openness were persistently similar to those listed in Table 2. With respect to 
the estimation results of EDUC_GAP, the variable of trade openness was positive in Table 3 
(a)–(c). In Table 3 (a), OPEN_1980 showed statistical significance whereas OPEN_1990 
and OPEN_2000 did not suggest significance in Table 3 (b) and (c). These results suggested 
a long-term effect of trade openness on the gender educational gap, while no medium-term 
effect of trade openness was observed. This is in line with Hypothesis 2. When it comes to 
the results of POLI_GAP and HEAL_GAP, trade openness did not show statistical 
significance in Table 3 (a)–(c). Therefore, trade openness did not affect the gender political 
and health gaps at all. In alternative specifications, the results presented in Table 4 (a)–(d) 
were almost the same as those presented in Tables 2 and 3 (a)–(c). Hence, the exclusion of 
DEMOCR and legal origin dummies did not influence the results of trade openness on the 
gender gaps. 
I now turn to the results of GMM 2SLS in Table 5 (a)–(d). First, I used the results of the 
under-identification and over-identification tests to check the validity of the GMM 2SLS 
model. A specification error occurs if the instrumental variables are correlated with the 
error term. In Table 5 (a)–(d), with the exception of column (3), the test statistics of the 
13 
 
over-identification test were not statistically significant and so did not reject the null 
hypothesis that additional instruments were uncorrelated with the error term. Moreover, in 
Table 5 (a)–(d), the test statistics of the under-identification test were statistically 
significant, meaning the null hypothesis that the estimation was under-identified was 
rejected and hence the under-identification test was passed. The combined results of the 
under-identification and over-identification tests showed that the GMM 2SLS was valid in 
Table 5 (a)–(d).  
As for WAGE_GAP, in Table 5 (a)–(d), trade openness was positive and statistically 
significant at the 1 % level. The absolute values of the coefficient were 0.09, 0.08, 0.08 and 
0.07 in OPEN_1970, OPEN_1980, OPEN_1990 and OPEN_2000. Therefore, the long-term 
effect of trade openness exceeded its medium-term effect. With respect to EDUC_GAP, in 
Table 5 (a)–(d), trade openness was positive and statistically significant.  
For robustness check, turning attention to Table 6 (a)–(d), the results of WAGE_GAP 
were almost identical to those in Table 5 (a)–(d). However, the statistical significance of 
EDUC_GAP varied among the tables although its coefficient was positive in all of them. 
The coefficients of OPEN_1970 and OPEN_1990 were positive and statistically significant, 
whereas those of OPEN_1980 and OPEN_2000 were not statistically significant. Therefore, 
the effect of openness on the gender educational gap was less robust than its effects on 
other gender gaps. 
Considering the results shown in Tables 2–6 jointly suggested: (1) Trade openness 
reduced the gender wage gap and its effect was greater in the long term than the medium 
term. (2) Trade openness in 1970 reduced the gender educational gap although the effects 
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of the openness in 1980, 1990 and 2000 disappeared in some specifications. Hence, the 
long-term effect of trade openness was clearly observed but its medium-term effect was less 
clear. 
The effect of trade openness on the wage gap decreased in the later part of the study 
period. This can be interpreted as implying that the early years of trade openness are more 
likely to see an increase in women’s marginal productivity as a result of decreasing the 
gender gap in educational attainment. Therefore, the longer-term effect of trade openness 
on the wage gap increased. That is, the difference in the effect of trade on the wage gap 
between years of trade openness reflects a decrease in the gender gap in terms of marginal 
productivity.  
Overall, the estimation results can be interpreted as follows: accumulation of women’s 
human capital through education saw women become skilled labor and so improved 
women’s marginal productivity. Restated, decreased educational inequality decreased the 
gender gap in labor productivity, in turn reducing the gender wage gap. Therefore, the 
gender wage gap was considered to partly reflect the gender productivity gap. However, 
besides this indirect effect of trade openness on the wage gap via education, trade openness 
also directly affected the wage gap by reducing discrimination against women in the labor 
market.  
Based on the findings of this paper, I argue that trade liberalization benefits women by 
increasing female wages, and I further infer that women should prefer trade liberalization. 
However, the existing literature provides evidence that women do not prefer trade 
liberalization (Mayda and Rodrik 2005; Blonigen 2011). An interesting paradox exists 
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between the findings of this paper and some of the rest of the literature. This raises the 
question of whether women are irrational concerning free trade. This paradox should be 
considered by bridging international and behavioral economics. 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
Globalization is expected to increase global competition and improve market function. 
In this situation, then assuming Becker’s theory holds true employment discrimination 
against women should decrease in the long run. Existing works that have examined this 
question have not considered the effect of globalization on other gender gaps such as 
educational attainment, political empowerment and health status. This paper thus attempted 
to investigate the long-term effect of trade openness on various gender gaps. Long-term 
effects of trade openness were observed on the wage and education gaps but not on the 
political and health gaps. Furthermore, the effect of trade openness on the wage gap was 
two or three times larger than its effect on the education gap. The effect of trade openness 
on the wage gap was observed regardless of the number of years for which trade openness 
had existed, although the effect was greater in early years than later years. On the other 
hand, the effect of trade openness on the gender education gap was not robustly observed 
for the later years (1980, 1990 and 2000).  
Overall, the estimation results can be interpreted as follows: decreased education 
inequality decreased the gender gap in labor productivity, which in turn decreased the wage 
gap. Therefore, the gender wage gap was considered to reflect the gender productivity gap. 
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However, besides this indirect effect of trade openness on the wage gap through education, 
there also existed a direct effect. Thus, trade openness reduced the gender wage gap caused 
by gender discrimination. The contribution of this paper is to clarify that market 
competition through international trade decreased not only the gender wage gap, but also 
the gap in educational attainment.  
Because of data limitations, this paper did not scrutinize the indirect channels though 
which trade openness reduced the gender wage gap. It is valuable to use individual-level 
data to decompose the effect of trade openness into the direct effect through decreased 
discrimination against women in the labor market and the indirect effect through a decrease 
in the gender marginal productivity gap. Besides, globalization accompanies not only trade 
openness but also massive population mobility and foreign direct investment. Existing 
works tried to shed light on the impact of population mobility on human capital investment 
(e.g., Anderson and Konard 2003 a; 2003 b). The impact of foreign direct investment on the 
gender wage gap was investigated (e.g., Neumayer and De Soyasa 2007; Oostendorp 2009). 
It is necessary to analyze the influences of international trade, migration and foreign direct 
investment jointly. Furthermore, it is interesting to consider how the findings of this paper 
related to women’s preferences regarding trade by bridging international economics and 
behavioral economics. These issues remain to be addressed in future studies. 
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FIGURE 1 (a) Relation between trade openness in 1970 and the gender wage gap in 2011 
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FIGURE 1 (b) Relation between trade openness in 1970 and the gender educational attainment gap in 2011 
 
FIGURE 1 (c) Relation between trade openness in 1970 and the gender political empowerment gap in 2011 
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FIGURE 1 (d) Relation between trade openness in 1970 and the gender health and survival gap in 2011 
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TABLE 1  
Definition and basic statistics of variables 
 Definition Mean value Standard 
deviation 
Source 
WAGE_GAP a Gender wage gap in 2011 
(female wage level / male wage level) * 100  
65.3 8.77 GGGR 2011 
EDUC_GAP a 
 
Gender education gap in 2011 
(female educational attainment / male educational attainment) * 100 
95.5 7.48 GGGR 2011 
POLI_GAP a 
 
Gender political empowerment gap in 2011 
(female empowerment level / male empowerment level) * 100 
17.0 13.2 GGGR 2011 
HEAL_GAP a 
 
Gender health and survival gap in 2011 
(female health and survival level / male health and survival level) * 100 
97.1 1.01 GGGR 2011 
OPEN_1970 b 
 
Trade openness in 1970 
Trade in 1970 / GDP in 1970 (%) 
55.0 39.0 World Bank 
Indicators 
OPEN_1980 b 
 
Trade openness in 1980 
Trade in 1980 / GDP in 1980 (%) 
60.9 40.6 World Bank 
Indicators 
OPEN_1990 b 
 
Trade openness in 1990 
Trade in 1990 / GDP in 1990 (%) 
61.6 43.7 World Bank 
Indicators 
OPEN_2000 b 
 
Trade openness in 2000 
Trade in 2000 / GDP in 2000 (%) 
80.1 49.0 World Bank 
Indicators 
GDP_1970 GDP per capita in 1970 (US $) 
 
6,574 7,831 Penn and World Table 
7.1 
GDP_1980 GDP per capita in 1980 (US $) 8,731 11,087 Penn and World Table 
24 
 
 7.1 
GDP_1990 GDP per capita in 1990 (US $) 
 
10,233 10,974 Penn and World Table 
7.1 
GDP_2000 GDP per capita in 2000 (US $) 
 
12,055 13,599 Penn and World Table 
7.1 
DEMOCR c Average degree of democracy within a country between 1970 and 1994. Degree of democracy: 
1 (Undemocratic) to 10 (Democratic) 
4.11 3.98 Website of Andrei 
Shleifer 
LEGAL_FR d French Legal Origin dummy 
 
0.44 0.49 Website of Andrei 
Shleifer 
LEGAL_SO d Socialist Legal Origin dummy 
 
0.18 0.39 Website of Andrei 
Shleifer 
LEGAL_GE d German Legal Origin dummy 
 
0.03 0.18 Website of Andrei 
Shleifer 
LEGAL_SC d Scandinavian Legal Origin dummy 
 
0.03 0.18 Website of Andrei 
Shleifer 
S_AMERICA South America countries dummy 
 
0.21 0.41  
ASIA Asian countries dummy 
 
0.13 0.34  
EUROPE European countries dummy 
 
0.21 0.41  
CATHO Catholic ratio in 1980 (%) 
 
31.2 36.3  
25 
 
PROT Protestant ratio in 1980 (%) 
 
11.9 21.2 Website of Andrei 
Shleifer 
MUSL Muslim ratio in 1980 (%) 
 
23.7 36.1 Website of Andrei 
Shleifer 
LATITUD Latitude of capital 
 
0.30 0.19 Website of Andrei 
Shleifer 
NOTES:  
a. In The Global Gender Gap Report 2011 (GGGR 2011), (female/male) ratio was reported. This paper uses the original ratio multiplied by 100 for convenience of interpretation. 
b. Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of gross domestic product.  
c. Website of Shleifer http://scholar.harvard.edu/shleifer/publications/quality-government (accessed on July 2, 2015). Data were sourced from an earlier work (LLSV 1999). 
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TABLE 2  
Determinants of gender gaps: Baseline model (SUR model) 
 (1) 
WAGE_GAP 
(2) 
EDUC_GAP 
(3) 
POLI_GAP 
(4) 
HEAL_GAP 
OPEN_1970 0.06*** 
(3.04) 
0.02** 
(2.07) 
−0.01 
(−0.62) 
−0.0001 
(−0.07) 
Ln(GDP_1970) −1.77 
(−1.53) 
1.65** 
(2.10) 
−4.19*** 
(−2.82) 
0.36** 
(2.50) 
DEMOCR 0.13 
(0.45) 
0.15 
(0.75) 
0.15 
(0.38) 
−0.004 
(−0.01) 
LEGAL_FR −4.17* 
(−1.90) 
−2.23 
(−1.50) 
−6.37** 
(−2.30) 
0.46* 
(1.68) 
LEGAL_SO −4.56 
(−1.12) 
2.15 
(0.78) 
−18.6*** 
(−3.56) 
0.30 
(0.60) 
LEGAL_GE −3.11 
(−0.78) 
−3.07 
(−1.14) 
−3.07 
(−0.60) 
0.66 
(1.34) 
LEGAL_SC 6.54 
(1.07) 
−4.17 
(−1.00) 
18.4** 
(2.35) 
0.81 
(1.07) 
S_AFRICA 1.72 
(0.64) 
−7.68*** 
(−4.23) 
−2.87 
(−0.84) 
0.06 
(0.19) 
ASIA −9.13 
(−0.35) 
−0.86 
(−0.49) 
5.14 
(1.56) 
−0.17 
(−0.53) 
EUROPE 2.13 
(0.72) 
−2.80 
(−1.39) 
5.31 
(1.39) 
−0.41 
(−1.11) 
CATHO −0.07** 
(−2.32) 
0.03* 
(1.74) 
0.13*** 
(3.25) 
0.003 
(0.91) 
PROT 0.01 
(0.24) 
0.04 
(0.96) 
0.13 
(1.48) 
−0.003 
(−0.44) 
MUSL 0.01 
(0.20) 
−0.04* 
(−1.98) 
−0.03 
(−0.87) 
−0.001 
(−0.36) 
LATITUD −6.69 
(−0.82) 
5.10 
(0.93) 
21.4** 
(2.07) 
−0.56 
(−0.56) 
R-Square 0.47 0.63 0.62 0.26 
Observations 92 92 92 92 
NOTES: Numbers in parentheses are z-values. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 %, 5 % and 
10 % levels, respectively. Constant is included, although its results were not reported. 
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TABLE 3  
Determinants of gender gaps using openness in different years (SUR model) 
(a) 
 (1) 
WAGE_GAP 
(2) 
EDUC_GAP 
(3) 
POLI_GAP 
(4) 
HEAL_GAP 
OPEN_1980 0.06*** 
(3.44) 
0.02* 
(1.65) 
−0.02 
(−1.03) 
0.0002 
(0.09) 
R-Square 0.48 0.64 0.63 0.28 
Observations 92 92 92 92 
 
(b) 
 (1) 
WAGE_GAP 
(2) 
EDUC_GAP 
(3) 
POLI_GAP 
(4) 
HEAL_GAP 
OPEN_1990 0.06*** 
(3.69) 
0.01 
(1.47) 
−0.007 
(−0.32) 
0.001 
(0.36) 
R-Square 0.48 0.61 0.64 0.25 
Observations 100 100 100 100 
 
(c) 
 (1) 
WAGE_GAP 
(2) 
EDUC_GAP 
(3) 
POLI_GAP 
(4) 
HEAL_GAP 
OPEN_2000 0.05*** 
(3.88) 
0.006 
(0.63) 
−0.001 
(−0.87) 
0.001 
(0.58) 
R-Square 0.47 0.62 0.62 0.23 
Observations 109 109 109 109 
 
NOTES: Logs of GDP in 1980, 1990 and 2000 were included in (a), (b) and (c), respectively. Besides the log of GDP, 
the set of variables included in the equation is equivalent to those used in Table 3 although estimation results were not 
reported.  
Numbers in parentheses are z-values. *** and * suggest statistical significance at the 1 % and 10 % levels, 
respectively.  
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TABLE 4  
Determinants of gender gaps excluding the proxy for democracy and legal origin dummies (SUR model) 
 
(a) 
 (1) 
WAGE_GAP 
(2) 
EDUC_GAP 
(3) 
POLI_GAP 
(4) 
HEAL_GAP 
OPEN_1970 0.06*** 
(3.15) 
0.02** 
(2.22) 
−0.03 
(−1.27) 
−0.00004 
(−0.19) 
R-Square 0.42 0.60 0.50 0.21 
Observations 95 95 95 95 
 
(b) 
 (1) 
WAGE_GAP 
(2) 
EDUC_GAP 
(3) 
POLI_GAP 
(4) 
HEAL_GAP 
OPEN_1980 0.06*** 
(3.30) 
0.02* 
(1.67) 
−0.04 
(−1.62) 
0.00002 
(0.11) 
R-Square 0.43 0.61 0.51 0.21 
Observations 95 95 95 95 
 
(c) 
 (1) 
WAGE_GAP 
(2) 
EDUC_GAP 
(3) 
POLI_GAP 
(4) 
HEAL_GAP 
OPEN_1990 0.06*** 
(3.97) 
0.02* 
(1.68) 
−0.01 
(−0.72) 
0.0001 
(0.32) 
R-Square 0.44 0.59 0.48 0.20 
Observations 100 100 100 100 
 
(d) 
 (1) 
WAGE_GAP 
(2) 
EDUC_GAP 
(3) 
POLI_GAP 
(4) 
HEAL_GAP 
OPEN_2000 0.05*** 
(3.81) 
0.01 
(1.26) 
−0.03* 
(−1.67) 
0.0001 
(0.30) 
R-Square 0.42 0.59 0.49 0.19 
29 
 
Observations 109 109 109 109 
 
NOTES: Besides DEMOCR and legal origin dummies, Table 4 (a)–(d) included the control variables, which were 
equivalent to those in Tables 3 and 4 (a)–(c), respectively. However, estimation results of control variables were not 
reported.  
Numbers in parentheses are z-values. ***, ** and * suggest statistical significance at the 1 %, 5 % and 10 % levels, 
respectively.  
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TABLE 5  
Determinants of gender gaps (GMM 2SLS model) 
(a) OPEN_1970 and the log of GDP_1970 are endogenous variables. Legal origin dummies, DEMOCR and 
population in 1970 are exogenous instrumental variables. 
 (1) 
WAGE_GAP 
(2) 
EDUC_GAP 
(3) 
POLI_GAP 
(4) 
HEAL_GAP 
OPEN_1970 0.09*** 
(3.08) 
0.04** 
(2.01) 
−0.02 
(−0.44) 
0.0001 
(0.16) 
Under-identification test 21.0 
p-value=0.00 
20.1 
p-value=0.00 
20.1 
p-value=0.00 
20.1 
p-value=0.00 
Over-identification test 
(Hansen J stat) 
4.54 
p-value=0.32 
5.97 
p-value=0.20 
12.1 
p-value=0.01 
5.84 
p-value=0.21 
Centered R-Square 0.42 0.57 0.45 0.17 
Observations 93 93 93 93 
 
(b) OPEN_1980 and the log of GDP_1980 are endogenous variables. Legal origin dummies, DEMOCR and 
population in 1980 are exogenous instrumental variables. 
 (1) 
WAGE_GAP 
(2) 
EDUC_GAP 
(3) 
POLI_GAP 
(4) 
HEAL_GAP 
OPEN_1980 0.08*** 
(2.98) 
0.04* 
(1.78) 
−0.02 
(−0.55) 
0.0003 
(0.69) 
Under-identification test 16.2 
p-value=0.00 
15.4 
p-value=0.00 
15.4 
p-value=0.00 
15.4 
p-value=0.00 
Over-identification test 
(Hansen J stat) 
5.49 
p-value=0.24 
6.34 
p-value=0.17 
12.0 
p-value=0.00 
5.42 
p-value=0.24 
Centered R-Square 0.43 0.57 0.45 0.17 
Observations 93 93 93 93 
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(c) OPEN_1990 and the log of GDP_1990 are endogenous variables. Legal origin dummies, DEMOCR and 
population in 1990 are exogenous instrumental variables. 
 (1) 
WAGE_GAP 
(2) 
EDUC_GAP 
(3) 
POLI_GAP 
(4) 
HEAL_GAP 
OPEN_1990 0.08*** 
(3.12) 
0.04** 
(2.23) 
−0.02 
(−0.40) 
−0.0001 
(−0.35) 
Under-identification test 17.0 
p-value=0.00 
15.0 
p-value=0.01 
15.0 
p-value=0.01 
15.0 
p-value=0.01 
Over-identification test 
(Hansen J stat) 
6.00 
p-value=0.19 
4.42 
p-value=0.35 
13.6 
p-value=0.00 
4.69 
p-value=0.32 
Centered R-Square 0.40 0.55 0.38 0.20 
Observations 101 101 101 101 
 
(d) OPEN_2000 and the log of GDP_2000 are endogenous variables. Legal origin dummies, DEMOCR and 
population in 2000 are exogenous instrumental variables. 
 (1) 
WAGE_GAP 
(2) 
EDUC_GAP 
(3) 
POLI_GAP 
(4) 
HEAL_GAP 
OPEN_2000 0.07*** 
(2.92) 
0.03* 
(1.66) 
−0.03 
(−0.84) 
−0.0001 
(−0.30) 
Under-identification test 18.9 
p-value=0.00 
16.4 
p-value=0.00 
16.4 
p-value=0.00 
16.4 
p-value=0.00 
Over-identification test 
(Hansen J stat) 
6.31 
p-value=0.17 
4.18 
p-value=0.38 
12.2 
p-value=0.01 
4.36 
p-value=0.35 
Centered R-Square 0.42 0.55 0.38 0.19 
Observations 110 110 110 110 
 
NOTES: The log of population size in the same year of the openness, DEMOCR and legal origin dummies were used 
as exogenous instrumental variables in the first stage but not the second stage. Besides these, a set of control variables 
were equivalent to those in Table 4 (a)–(d), respectively. However, estimation results of control variables were not 
reported.  
Numbers in parentheses are z-values. ***, ** and * suggest the statistical significance at the 1 %, 5 % and 10 % 
levels, respectively.  
 
 
32 
 
 
TABLE 6  
Determinants of gender gaps (GMM 2SLS model) 
(a) OPEN_1970 and the log of GDP_1970 are endogenous variables. Legal origin dummies and population in 1970 
are exogenous instrumental variables. 
 (1) 
WAGE_GAP 
(2) 
EDUC_GAP 
(3) 
POLI_GAP 
(4) 
HEAL_GAP 
OPEN_1970 0.11*** 
(3.40) 
0.04* 
(1.83) 
0.01 
(0.15) 
0.0001 
(0.18) 
Under-identification test 10.3 
p-value=0.03 
9.46 
p-value=0.05 
9.46 
p-value=0.05 
9.46 
p-value=0.05 
Over-identification test 
(Hansen J stat) 
3.17 
p-value=0.36 
5.96 
p-value=0.11 
10.3 
p-value=0.01 
5.43 
p-value=0.14 
Centered R-Square 0.40 0.57 0.47 0.14 
Observations 93 93 93 93 
 
(b) OPEN_1980 and the log of GDP_1980 are endogenous variables. Legal origin dummies and population in 1980 
are exogenous instrumental variables. 
 (1) 
WAGE_GAP 
(2) 
EDUC_GAP 
(3) 
POLI_GAP 
(4) 
HEAL_GAP 
OPEN_1980 0.10*** 
(3.24) 
0.04 
(1.58) 
−0.01 
(−0.12) 
0.0003 
(0.70) 
Under-identification test 8.58 
p-value=0.07 
8.00 
p-value=0.01 
8.00 
p-value=0.01 
8.00 
p-value=0.01 
Over-identification test 
(Hansen J stat) 
4.75 
p-value=0.18 
6.18 
p-value=0.10 
10.1 
p-value=0.01 
5.13 
p-value=0.16 
Centered R-Square 0.40 0.58 0.48 0.14 
Observations 93 93 93 93 
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(c) OPEN_1990 and the log of GDP_1990 are endogenous variables. Legal origin dummies and population in 1990 
are exogenous instrumental variables. 
 (1) 
WAGE_GAP 
(2) 
EDUC_GAP 
(3) 
POLI_GAP 
(4) 
HEAL_GAP 
OPEN_1990 0.08*** 
(3.24) 
0.04** 
(2.20) 
−0.01 
(−0.30) 
−0.001 
(−0.41) 
Under-identification test 7.67 
p-value=0.10 
5.62 
p-value=0.22 
5.62 
p-value=0.22 
5.62 
p-value=0.22 
Over-identification test 
(Hansen J stat) 
5.58 
p-value=0.13 
4.25 
p-value=0.23 
13.5 
p-value=0.00 
5.06 
p-value=0.16 
Centered R-Square 0.42 0.55 0.42 0.21 
Observations 101 101 101 101 
 
(d) OPEN_2000 and the log of GDP_2000 are endogenous variables. Legal origin dummies and population in 2000 
are exogenous instrumental variables. 
 (1) 
WAGE_GAP 
(2) 
EDUC_GAP 
(3) 
POLI_GAP 
(4) 
HEAL_GAP 
OPEN_2000 0.07*** 
(2.86) 
0.03 
(1.53) 
−0.04 
(−0.92) 
−0.002 
(−0.56) 
Under-identification test 15.0 
p-value=0.00 
11.9 
p-value=0.01 
11.9 
p-value=0.01 
11.9 
p-value=0.01 
Over-identification test 
(Hansen J stat) 
6.21 
p-value=0.10 
3.91 
p-value=0.27 
12.3 
p-value=0.00 
4.61 
p-value=0.20 
Centered R-Square 0.42 0.55 0.38 0.19 
Observations 110 110 110 110 
 
 
NOTES: Besides DEMOCR, exogenous instrumental variables were the same as in Table 5. Besides these, the set of 
control variables were equivalent to those in Table 4 (a)–(d), respectively. However, estimation results of control 
variables were not reported.  
Numbers in parentheses are z-values. ***, ** and * suggest the statistical significance at the 1 %, 5 % and 10 % 
levels, respectively.  
 
 
